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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND THE
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978: How FAR CAN THE COURTS
EXPAND THE COVERAGE OF THE PDA TO PROTECT REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY?
I. INTRODUCTION
A young wife begins her career as an attorney soon after she passes the
bar exam. She spends several years working long, hard hours until she final-
ly receives the news that she will become a partner. At the same time she
hears of this promotion, she also finds out that she will become a mother.
After the law firm learns of this news, they immediately terminate her em-
ployment because they fear that her pregnancy will interfere with her job.
Situations similar to the one above are the primary reason that Con-
gress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA).' This act
amended the Civil Rights Act of 1965 to add pregnancy protection within
the scope of sex discrimination by employers. Under the PDA, any adverse
treatment of an employee based on pregnancy, childbirth, or other pregnan-
cy-related medical condition is actionable as sexual discrimination.
Even though the situation above is clearly within the scope of the PDA,
a number of new PDA cases have arisen over the past twenty years that have
lead to disagreements among the courts. The primary disagreement is
whether infertility or infertility treatments fall within the scope of the PDA.
For example, what if a woman is fired after missing several weeks of
work due to receiving several rounds infertility treatments, such as in vitro
fertilization procedure? Does the PDA protect this woman even though she
is not yet pregnant? Are treatments to facilitate conception of an infertile
mother part of "pregnancy-related medical conditions"? Or, should these
days missed by the employee be treated like any other employee's truancy?
These types of questions plague the courts with uncertainty during a
time when there have been significant advancements of medical technolo-
gies to treat infertility. First, this note will give a detailed background of the
1. This Act celebrated its thirtieth anniversary last year, but the numbers of claims
continue to rise. At a symposium recognizing this anniversary, the National Partnership for
Women and Families stated that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission saw a
sixty-five percent increase in claims charging pregnancy discrimination from 1992 through
2007. See National Partnership for Women and Families, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
Where We Stand 30 Years Later, at 2 (Oct. 2008), available at
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/DocServer/PregnancyDiscrimination Act-
_Where we stand 30_yearsL.pdf?doclD=4281.
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cases which have attempted to define the scope of the PDA.2 Next, this note
will discuss the different processes courts can use to interpret statutes, spe-
cifically the PDA.3 The last section of the note will argue that the PDA
clearly does not include protection for women who are infertile or those
women undergoing procedures to treat their infertility.4
II. BACKGROUND
When determining whether infertility or infertility treatments are pro-
tected under the PDA, the court must first look at the bulk of case law that
has attempted to define the scope of this statute. This section details the cas-
es that have framed the argument on both sides of this issue.
A. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Overruling of General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert5
President Jimmy Carter signed the PDA into law on October 31, 1978.6
This law amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, making it illeg-
al to discriminate against a person on the basis of pregnancy.7 The enact-
ment of this law by Congress was in direct response to the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.
8
In Gilbert, a group of female employees filed a class action suit against
General Electric for excluding pregnancy from the company's disability
2. See infra Part II, A, B, C.
3. See infra Part 11, D.
4. See infra Part III.
5. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
6. COMM. ON LABOR AND HUMAN RES., 96TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978, at III (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter LEGIS.
HISTORY OF PDA].
7. Id. at III.
8. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 125 [cases that discuss the General Electric decision refer to it
as the Gilbert case, thus, for the purposes of this article, the author will refer to this decision
as the Gilbert case.]. During the debate on the House floor, Representative Augustus Hankins
from California stated that because of the decision in Gilbert, this bill was introduced "to
clarify congressional intent that sex discrimination includes discrimination based on pregnan-
cy and specifically to define the standards which require that pregnant workers be treated the
same as other employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work." LEGIS. HISTORY OF
PDA, supra note 6, at 166. There are numerous law review articles that were published in
response to the decision in Gilbert. These articles criticized the decision to not protect preg-
nancy under Title VII and gave various approaches to circumvent the ruling. See Nancy S.
Erickson, Pregnancy Discrimination: An Analytical Approach, 5 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 83
(1979); Gene Ann Roelofs, Sex Discrimination and Insurance Planning: The Rights of Preg-
nant Men and Women Under General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 22 ST. LOuiS U. L.J. 101 (1978);
Kathleen R. McGrath, Pregnancy-Based Discrimination-General Electric Co. v. Gilbert and
Alternative State Remedies, 81 DICK. L. REv. 517 (1977).
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plan coverage of nonoccupational sickness and accident benefits.9 The em-
ployees claimed this constituted discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and the District Court for the Eastern District of Virgin-
ia agreed, holding that the exclusion of pregnancy from General Electric's
disability plan violated Title VII.O
The Court granted certiorari on the case after the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's decision." In an opinion delivered by Justice
Rehnquist, the Court reversed the decision of the lower courts, stating that
failure to cover pregnancy-related disabilities under the company's disabili-
ty plan was not a violation of Title VII.'2
Section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for
an employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[J" '3 The "because
of . . . sex" interpretation was important to Justice Rehnquist's opinion,
which stated that without gender-based discrimination in effect or in form
there cannot be discrimination under section 703(a)(1)."4 The Court claimed
that a disability plan is "nothing more than an insurance package which,
covers some risks, but excludes others."' 5 The "package" at issue in Gilbert
covered and excluded the same risks for male and female employees.' 6 The
Court held that Title VII does not require a disability plan to be all-
inclusive, and just because pregnancy affects women to a greater degree
does not mean the noninclusion of disability benefits for pregnancy is facial-
ly a gender-based discrimination. 7
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens asked whether the disability
plan provided by General Electric, treating absences caused by pregnancy
differently than other kinds of absences, was discrimination because of an
individual's sex. 8 He believed the disability plan was discriminatory be-
cause the rules relating to absenteeism were not based on neutral criteria,
such as whether the absence was voluntary or involuntary. The plan, he
9. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 127-28.
10. Id. at 128.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 146-47.
13. Id. at 133 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000)).
14. Id. at 138 (citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (ruling against an em-
ployee's Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim that it was sex discrimination to
exclude pregnancy from disability program established under California law), superseded by
statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076, as recog-
nized in Newport News Shipbuilding v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983)).
15. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 138-40.
18. Id. at 161 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2010]
UALR LAW REVIEW
stated, puts pregnancy in a criteria by itself, and because the ability to be-
come pregnant is a primary difference between men and women, the plan
was discriminatory on its face because of sex. 9
After this decision, Congress had to make sure that discrimination based
on pregnancy would be considered sex discrimination under Title VII. 20
With the passage of the PDA, Congress added a new subsection (k) to the
definition of section 701 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.21
The section now reads: "The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex"
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes[.]
' 22
B. Applying the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
1. Newport News
The first case brought before the Court addressing the new amendment
to Title VII was Newport News Shipbuilding v. EEOC.23 Delivering the ma-
jority opinion, Justice Stevens borrowed significantly from his dissent in
Gilbert in defining how this new statute protected pregnant women.24
In Newport News, the company amended its health insurance plan on
the effective date of the PDA to include coverage of expenses relating to
pregnancy-related conditions. This coverage was extended to all female
employees; however, the insurance plan provided less coverage to spouses
of male employees.
The Court's opinion stated that section 703(a) of Title VII makes it un-
lawful to discriminate against individuals with respect to "compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
... sex[.], 26 Because a company's insurance plan is compensation for or a
privilege of employment, male employees have a right, as well as females,
not to be discriminated against based on the coverage of that insurance. The
insurance plan in Newport News provided full coverage for medical-related
cost to the spouses of female employees, and it gave the same coverage to
19. Id. at 161-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
20. LEGIS. HISTORY ON PDA, supra note 6, at 74-75 (recording remarks of Senator Bayh
during debate on the Senate floor).
21. Id. at III.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
23. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
24. Id. at 670.
25. Id. at 669.
26. Id. at 676 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§2002e-2(a) (1976)).
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the spouses of male employees minus any pregnancy-related expenses.27 The
Court said that the PDA makes it clear that it is discriminatory on its face if
a company treats pregnancy-related medical expenses less favorably than
other medical expenses.28 The Court held that the company's insurance plan
was discriminatory because it did not allow the same amount of pregnancy-
related coverage for male employees' spouses as it did for their female em-
ployees, and, thereby discriminated against the male employees.29
The Court's decision in Newport News effectively overruled Gilbert. It
is an important case because it holds that pregnancy itself is protected under
Title VII; however, as the cases that follow will show, Newport News pro-
vided little guidance as to the exact scope of protection provided by this
newly enacted statute. Still, the question of coverage for infertility treat-
ments remains.
2. International Union
The Supreme Court began to provide answers regarding the relatedness
of infertility and the PDA in International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc.
30
In that case, a group of employees filed a class action suit against their em-
ployer for its fetal-protection policy.31 Johnson Controls was in the business
of making batteries, and the main ingredient in the process of making batte-
ries is lead.32 Research shows lead could cause harm to a fetus when the
mother is exposed. 13 Johnson Controls's policy prohibited women capable
of being pregnant from working in jobs involving lead exposure. 34 The only
women excused were those that had medical documentation of their inabili-
ty to bear children.35
In the Court's decision, it claimed that Johnson Controls's policy did
not classify women on the basis of infertility alone, but rather on the basis of
gender and childbearing capacity.36 The Court noted that infertility affects
men as well as women.37 Johnson Controls, however, chose to explicitly
classify all of its employees on the basis of their potential for pregnancy, not
solely on the basis of infertility. Thus, under the PDA the "choice evinces
27. Id. at 682-83.
28. Id. at 685.
29. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 685.
30. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
31. Id. at 192.
32. Id. at 190.
33. Id. at 191.
34. Id. at 192.
35. Id.




discrimination on the basis of sex., 38 Though the Court in International Un-
ion discussed the implication of infertility in sexual discrimination cases
based on the PDA's amendment to Title VII, the cases that follow reveal
confusion about the impact that infertility treatments have on these discrim-
ination cases.
C. Further Defining Infertility in the Courts
The courts are firmly split on both sides of the issue. The next portion
of this note will first discuss the decisions of courts that hold that infertility
treatment is not covered by the PDA because it is facially neutral in that it
affects men and women similarly.39 Thus, any decision made by a company
based on treatment of infertility is not discriminatory "because of ... sex."4
This note will then address two decisions which hold that infertility treat-
ments may be covered under the PDA.4 These courts argue that infertility
treatment is protected under the plain statutory reading of the PDA, and also
that it was Congress's intent in passing the PDA to protect all aspects of
pregnancy, including treatment of the inability to become pregnant.
1. Infertility Not Protected Under the PDA
The first United States court of appeals case that decided whether infer-
tility was covered by the PDA was Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Cr.42
The employee in this case was diagnosed with a disorder that made it im-
possible for her to become pregnant.43 She received artificial insemination
treatments and eventually gave birth to a baby girl." Her company's health
care plan paid for her pregnancy and all related expenses, but the plan did
not cover the artificial insemination.45
The employee in Krauel claimed that the employer's medical plan vi-
olated the PDA because infertility is a medical condition related to pregnan-
cy or childbirth.46 In support of her claim, she cited International Union for
the proposition that discrimination based on the potential for pregnancy is
discrimination on the basis of sex under the PDA.47 The court held that po-
38. Id. at 199.
39. See infra Part II.C.1.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
41. See infra Part II.C.1.
42. 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).
43. Id. at 675.
44. Id. at 676.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 679.




tential for pregnancy is covered by the PDA because it is exclusive to wom-
en but stated that infertility is not covered because it equally affects both
women and men.48 This decision also distinguished Pacourek v. Inland Steel
Co.,49 stating that relying on the legislative history of the PDA is not persua-
sive because there is no direct evidence that Congress intended that infertili-
ty be covered under the PDA. 0 Thus, this court authoritatively held that
infertility is not covered under the PDA.51
The next case that denied protection under the PDA for women claim-
ing discrimination based on infertility was Saks v. Franklin Covey Co.52 The
facts of this case were similar to those of Krauel. The employer's health
benefit plan did not cover surgical impregnation procedures such as in vitro
fertilization." The employee claimed that this exclusion violated the PDA.54
The Second Circuit held that the statutory language of the PDA-
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of pregnancy or pregnancy-related
conditions-was broader than pregnancy alone.5 The court said that a con-
dition only falls within the protection of the PDA if that medical condition is
unique to women.56 The court reasoned that infertility affects men and wom-
en equally, and thus the exclusion of surgical impregnation for the correc-
tive purpose of infertility affects both men and women in the same manner.
57
This court again decided, as the federal district court in Krauel decided, that
infertility is not covered by the PDA's amendment to Title VII.
58
These two cases found that infertility is a condition equally common
among men and women. To trigger discrimination "because of sex" under
the PDA, the employee must show that she is being discriminated against
based on a medical procedure that is unique to women. It is not enough for
the procedure to be done merely to facilitate pregnancy. Below is a discus-
sion of the opposite side of the current split, affmnatively deciding that the
PDA does protect infertility and its treatment.
2. Fertility Treatment Protected Under the PDA
The only other federal court of appeals addressing whether infertility
treatments fall within the scope of the PDA and Title VII is the Seventh
48. Id.
49. 858 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. 111. 1994).
50. Krauel, 95 F.3d at 680.
51. Id.
52. 316 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2003).
53. Id. at 341.
54. Id. at 345.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 346.
57. Id.
58. Saks, 316 F.3d at 346.
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Circuit in Hall v. Nalco Co.59 The court in Hall based its opinion on two
federal decisions from the northern district of Illinois: Pacourek v. Inland
Steel Co.6 and Erickson v. Board of Governors.6'
In Pacourek, the plaintiff worked for the Inland Steel Company for
eleven years before a doctor diagnosed her with esphofical reflux, a medical
condition that prevented her from becoming pregnant.62 She began to re-
ceive in vitro fertilization treatments from the University of Chicago and
notified her employer that she was trying to get pregnant through this expe-
rimental treatment.6 3 Pacourek claimed that the defendants disparately ap-
plied their sick leave policy to her and terminated her because of esphofical
reflux. 4
The Pacourek court began its analysis by stating its understanding of
the general principle of Newport News. 65 The court indicated that only wom-
en can become pregnant, and stereotypes or classifications based on preg-
nancy or any related medical conditions are never gender-neutral.66 From
this, the court reasoned that "discrimination against persons who intend to or
can potentially become pregnant is discrimination against women.
67
The court then moved from its analysis of infertility to the legislative
history of the PDA.68 The court pointed out that during debate on the Senate
floor, Senator Harrison Williams, chief sponsor of the Senate bill leading to
the PDA, continually commented that, historically, women have been the
target of sex discrimination because of their "capacity to become preg-
nant.,,69 The court took this to mean that the interpretation of the statute
should be broad enough to include more than just pregnancy itself.
70
With this case law and statutory interpretation, the Pacourek court be-
lieved that a medical condition that rendered the plaintiff unable to become
pregnant naturally "is a medical condition related to pregnancy and child-
birth for purposes of the [PDA]."' The court reasoned that the neutrality
argument ("[because] both men and women cannot become pregnant, infer-
59. 534 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2008).
60. 858 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. 111. 1994).
61. 911F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
62. Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1396.
63. Id. Pacourek was actually the University of Chicago's first patient to receive in vitro
fertilization. She alleged that both she and the school expended substantial amounts of time
and money for this procedure. Id.
64. Id. at 1397.
65. Id. at 1401 (citing Newport News Shipbuilding v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983)).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1402.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1403.
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tility is a gender neutral condition")7 2 failed because infertility-the inability
to become pregnant-is a medical condition that is protected by the PDA
and not neutral at all.73 This court brought infertility under the umbrella pro-
tection of Title VII.
The court in Erickson v. Board of Governors based it analysis directly
on the decision in Pacourek.74 Melinda Erickson was an employee of Nor-
theastern Illinois University.75 During her employment, Erickson used her
accrued sick-leave time to undergo infertility treatments.76 She claimed that
her supervisor expressed disapproval of her frequent use of sick leave for
infertility treatments.77 Erickson was eventually terminated, and she claimed
that she was discriminated against because of her infertility treatments, a
medical condition related to pregnancy.78
The Erickson court agreed with Pacourek when it denied the employ-
er's motion to dismiss.79 It reasoned that the PDA is broad in that it covers
discrimination based on actual pregnancy or any intended or potential preg-
nancy. 80 It decided that infertility is a pregnancy-related condition and
should be covered under the PDA.8' These two federal district court deci-
sions ultimately led to a similar holding in Hall v. Nalco Co.
82
Cheryl Hall was hired by Nalco in 1997 and later took the role as sales
secretary for Marv Baldwin, a district sales manager.83 In 2003, she re-
quested time off from her job to undergo an in vitro fertilization procedure. 
8
Mr. Baldwin approved her leave of absence for one month. 85 When she re-
turned to work, Ms. Hall notified Mr. Baldwin that she would need to take
another month off from work because the first procedure was unsuccessful.
86
During the time these in vitro fertilization treatments were taking place,
the company consolidated two of its sales offices and determined that they
needed to retain only one of the two sales secretaries. 87 Baldwin terminated
Hall, saying it "was in [her] best interest due to [her] health condition. 88
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Erickson, 911 F. Supp. at 319.
75. Id. at 317.




80. Erickson, 911 F. Supp. at 319.
81. Id.
82. 534 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2008).
83. Id. at 645.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 646.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Hall, 534 F.3d at 646.
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The record shows that Baldwin also had a conversation with the employee
relations manager during which it was revealed that Hall "had missed a lot
of work due to her health," citing "absenteeism-infertility treatments" as
the reason. 9
Hall claimed that her termination amounted to discrimination for being
a female with a pregnancy-related condition-infertility.9" The court heard
the case after the district court granted summary judgment for the defendant
on the ground that infertile women were not a protected class under the
PDA.9 The Hall court overruled the district court's decision in as far as it
relied on the cases of Saks v. Franklin Covey Co. and Krauel v. Iowa Me-
thodist Med. Ctr. for their emphasis on the classification of infertility
alone.92 The appellate court went on to state that the district courts should
have relied on International Union for its interpretation of the scope of the
PDA.93 The appellate court in Hall explained that, based on International
Union's interpretation, infertility alone may not be actionable, but the infer-
tility issue must still be gender neutral.94
The court's logic was that persons who take time off to have in vitro
fertilization or other pregnancy-related operations would always be wom-
en.95 The court characterized this case not as an issue of infertility treatments
in general, but looked at the situation more broadly.96 It stated this was a
case where termination was based on childbearing capacity.97 Thus, this case
was a termination based on a gender quality specific only to women. 9 In
response, the court said that Hall had a cognizable claim under the PDA. 9
As the case law above points out, a court is faced with a problem when
it tries to define the scope of the PDA by using only case law. In this sort of




92. Id. at 647-49 (citing Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2003);
Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996)). The court in Saks adduced
that "[i]ncluding infertility within the PDA's protection as a 'related medical condition []'
would result in the anomaly of defining a class that simultaneously includes equal numbers of
both sexes and yet is somehow vulnerable to sex discrimination." Saks, 316 F.3d at 346.
93. Hall, 534 F.3d at 648-49 (citing Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187
(1991)). The court in Hall points out that it is implicit in International Union's interpretation
of the scope of PDA that classifications based on fertility alone or infertility alone are not
prohibited by PDA because they are not gender-specific. Id. at 648.
94. Id. at 648 (citing Newport News Shipbuilding v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983)).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 649.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Hall, 534 F.3d at 649.
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next section of this note discusses how courts use such interpretation to de-
fine the meaning of a particular statute.
D. Statutory Interpretation
The central question important to the cases discussed above is whether
the PDA expanded the coverage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
to include protection for women's infertility treatments. The disagreement
of these courts in their decisions is primarily based on their interpretation of
the statute. A general understanding of statutory interpretation is important
to the understanding of this issue; thus, a basic primer follows.
When interpreting a statute, a court should first look at the plain mean-
ing of the words. If it is clear, then the inquiry into the meaning of the text is
finished because "the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to
its terms."'' ° As is apparent by disparate interpretations of the PDA, the sta-
tute does not provide a clear meaning by looking at its words alone. This
section will look at two different tools courts use in statutory interpretation.
First, it will discuss a general understanding of canons of statutory construc-
tion, which a majority of legal scholars have refuted as a method of statutory
interpretation, but which are still used notwithstanding. This section will
close with a discussion of the use of legislative history.
1. Canons of Statutory Construction
Canons of statutory construction are judicially created maxims that are
used to decipher the meaning of a statute.'0 ' There are many different types
of canons available for judicial use, but it is only necessary to refer to two in
this section. The first are canons of word associations- specifically, ejus-
dem generis."°
Under ejusdem generis, a Latin phrase meaning "of the same kind,"'0 3 a
term that follows a specific enumeration shall apply only to the general kind
or class specifically enumerated." 4 This canon encompasses the idea that an
individual statute shall not be broadly interpreted unless the lawmaking
body indicates otherwise.'0 5
100. ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 10 (1997) (citing Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,
485 (1917)).
101. Id. at 23-24.
102. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
261 (2d ed. 2006).
103. Id.
104. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950).
105. ESKRIDGE, supra note 102, at 262.
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The second set of canons is that of negative implication, inclusion un-
ius est exclusion alterius.10 6 This Latin phrase means "the inclusion ... of
one thing suggests the exclusion of all others."' 7 Judges who apply this ca-
non argue that if the legislature specifically excludes a term from a statute's
application, then any other term that is not specifically excluded shall be
considered included. This logic rests on the reasoning that by prohibiting a
specific term, the legislature intends for the specifically prohibited term to
apply only when specifically included elsewhere." 8
As previously stated, the use of canons as a method of statutory inter-
pretation has fallen out of favor with many legal intellectuals. There are two
major criticisms of canons: (1) they are "not a coherent shared body of law
from which correct answers can be drawn," and (2) legal commentators con-
sider many canons to be incorrect. °9
Karl Llewellyn presented the first objection to the use of canons in sta-
tutory construction. He stated that every canon could have two opposing
points on every point."0 Operating under this premise, Llewellyn argued
that statutory interpretation based on specific canons could not yield correct
answers. In order to prove his point and refute their significance, Llewellyn
took a list of canons and wrote out each of their opposing points. For exam-
ple, Llewellyn stated the opposing points of ejusdem generis in the follow-
ing way:
It is a general rule of construction that where general words follow an
enumeration they are to be held as applying only to persons and things of
the same general kind or class specifically mentioned (ejusdem generis).
General words must operate on something. Further, ejusdem generis is
only an aid in getting the meaning and does not warrant confining the
operations of a statute within narrower limits than were intended.'
The next objection to using canons to interpret statutes is that most are
simply wrong." 2 Judges applying canons presume that they are the intent of
the legislature. Canons do not allow for an inquiry into the exact intent of
the legislature, and they are at "odds with legislative supremacy ... by forc-
ing the burden on the legislature to overcome a judicial presumption, rather
than requiring the court to dig for the meaning."'" 13 In other words, these
canons do not give credence to the legislative process.
106. Id. at 263.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 100, at 25.
110. Llewellyn, supra note 104, at 401.
111. Id. at 405.




Despite these criticisms, judges still widely use canons to interpret sta-
tutes, as seen in the cases discussed above that interpret the PDA.' la This is
particularly true at the state level because there is often not enough legisla-
tive history for interpretation." 5 Legislative history gives the interpreter of
the statute something to balance the canon against." 6
2. Legislative History
Aside from the plain meaning of a statute, its legislative history is the
most important tool in determining the intention or purpose of those who
enacted it. An interpreter of a statute should use the legislative history only
if it is relevant, reliable, and routinely discerned by interpreters at a reasona-
ble cost."7 Unfortunately, a hierarchy of legislative history sources con-
strains these standards." 
8
The most authoritative source at the top of this hierarchy is committee
reports. Committee reports are useful because they tell the interpreter the
policy and need behind the statute, give a detailed analysis of the entire sta-
tute, and state how each part of that statute relates to the whole.' Commit-
tee reports are available in a variety of different forms, and they often speak
to the relevant issues.
120
Explanatory statements by sponsors or floor managers of legislation are
another important source of legislative history.12 1 These statements are per-
suasive because they usually refer to the direct coverage of the statute itself.
They give the interpreter an understanding of the purpose of a particular
statute as intended by those legislators who enacted it.
122
After the committee reports and the sponsor statements, the persua-
siveness of various legislative sources drops off dramatically. These other
legislative sources, such as the colloquy on the floor and subsequent history,
may still be helpful if the two superior forms do not address the particular
issue searched for within the statute. 123 The interpreters must determine the
relevant material within the legislative material, and if it is reliable, relevant,
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The remainder of the note will rely on case law and tools of statutory
interpretation to illustrate how infertility and infertility treatments are clearly
not covered within the intended scope of the PDA and Title VII. First, this
section will review case law to demonstrate how the courts that found for
protection of infertility and infertility treatments erroneously failed to follow
legal precedent. Second, this section will use the two tools of statutory in-
terpretation, canons of statutory interpretation and legislative history, to
demonstrate the meaning of the PDA.
A. Interpreting the Case Law
The case law detailed above, which present arguments for both sides of
the issue, leaves courts in a grey area as to whether infertility or treatments
for infertility are protected from discrimination by the PDA. When analyz-
ing the early cases of International Union 2 4 and Newport News, 25 it be-
comes clear that the PDA only grants protection for pregnancy discrimina-
tion based on sex; because infertility is gender neutral, courts should not
award Title VII protection in cases where the plaintiff alleges discrimination
on the basis of infertility.
The courts in Pacourek and Erickson based their analyses on the fact
that women who seek infertility treatment are persons who intend to be
pregnant or potentially could be pregnant. Thus, the courts reasoned that
these women should receive the protection intended by the PDA. The two
courts could have reached this conclusion had they relied on the holdings in
International Union and Newport News and found that the disparate treat-
ment of the females seeking infertility treatments was based on their sex.
Because neither court made such a finding, the analyses in both Pacourek
and Erickson are flawed.
In both International Union and Newport News, the Supreme Court of
the United States stated that any sort of policy outlined by a company is
discriminatory under Title VII if the discrimination is based on a person's
gender or childbearing capacity. In Pacourek, Erickson, and Hall, the em-
ployees were ultimately terminated because of excessive use of sick-leave
time due to infertility treatments. If these terminations were strictly based on
excessive leave, these policies were not discriminating on the basis of a per-
son's gender or childbearing capacity. Would the courts have ruled the same
if it was a man who missed excessive work days for infertility treatments?
124. 499U.S. 187 (1991).
125. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
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The court in Hall argued that persons who receive infertility treatments
or pregnancy-related operations would always be women. 126 This is not true
because there are many surgeries offered to men to correct infertility prob-
lems; a simple internet search demonstrates this point. 127 Although it seems
that the case law supports the holding that infertility and infertility treat-
ments are not covered by the PDA, it is important to also look at the statute
itself, on which each of these courts based their holdings, to gain a firmer
understanding of its meaning.
B. Statutory Interpretation the PDA
The text of the PDA does not directly mention infertility. In interpret-
ing the PDA, the courts have reached opposing outcomes. As the statutory
interpretation demonstrated in the remainder of the note will show, however,
the PDA clearly does not confer protection for infertility and infertility
treatment.
The subsection that follows will review the two canons of statutory
construction used in the case law, and then make an argument as to the cor-
rect usage of this tool. The next subsection will review the legislative history
of the statute and how this information can best be used in the interpretation
of the PDA.
1. Canons of Statutory Interpretation and the PDA
The court in Pacourek, based part of its decision-that infertility was
encompassed within the meaning of the PDA--on a settled canon of statuto-
ry construction.1 28 This canon was "'that remedial statutes, such as civil
rights laws, are to be broadly construed.' '1 29 The court stated that the phras-
ing of the statute-"pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions' ° -required the reader to take a broad approach in interpreting its
meaning. 1 ' This allowed the court to conclude that infertility was a medical
condition related to pregnancy that would be allowed as a claim under Title
VII. 132
126. Hall v. Nalco, Co., 534 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2008).
127. See James Buchanan Brady Urological Institute, http://urology.jhu.edu/male/ (last
visited Mar. 29, 2010).
128. Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1402 (N.D. I11. 1994).
129. Id. (quoting Stoner v. Dep't of Agric., 846 F. Supp. 738, 742 (W.D. Wis. 1994)).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
131. Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1402.
132. Id. at 1402-04.
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The decision in Krauel is another example of the use of canons of sta-
tutory construction to interpret the meaning of the PDA.'33 The Krauel court
applied the rule that "'when a general term follows a specific one, the gen-
eral term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the one
with specific enumeration."" 34 The court stated that the term "medical con-
dition" was a general term that followed the specific terms "pregnancy" and
"childbirth."' 35 This means that if a medical condition is outside the context
of childbirth or pregnancy, it is not covered by the PDA unless specifically
stated elsewhere in the statute.'36 According to the Krauel court, this canon
proved that infertility was not covered by the PDA because it was not within
the context of pregnancy or childbirth.'37
As stated before, canons of statutory construction have been widely
debunked by the legal intellectual community for many reasons. Because
courts used these tools of statutory interpretation in construing the PDA, this
discussion is necessary. The canon used by the Pacourek court seems
flawed by its very words. The court stated that remedial statutes shall be
broadly construed. If remedial statutes should always be broadly construed,
why add "pregnancy, childbirth, and medical-related conditions?" A broad
understanding of pregnancy would encompass childbirth and the medical-
related conditions that went along with it. It seems the legislature would
have broadened the language if it intended for the entire statute to be inter-
preted broadly.
The canon used by the Krauel court is persuasive because the court fol-
lowed the rule when it gave the logic behind its conclusion. The rule is that
when a general term follows a specific term, the general term shall be un-
derstood as a reference to the subject given by the specific term. The terms
"pregnancy" and "childbirth" are specific because of the plain meaning of
each term. The term "medical-related condition" is general and must be un-
derstood as referring to the conditions related to pregnancy and childbirth. It
seems logical that neither infertility nor infertility treatment is a medical
condition specific to either pregnancy or childbirth. Thus, the term "medi-
cal-related condition" is specific only to infertility.
Although the canons of statutory construction do not create a perfect
understanding of the PDA, they do allow courts to refute the notion that the
PDA covers infertility treatments. Ultimately, the complete legislative histo-
ry is the best tool that courts have to interpret the statute.
133. Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 1996).







2. Legislative History of the PDA
When looking at the legislative history of the PDA, it is apparent that
Congress meant to clarify the scope of Title VII, specifically with regard to
sex discrimination. After General Electric Co. v. Gilbert was decided,'38 the
legislature felt obligated to add, within the statutory code, explicit protection
for women being discriminated against for pregnancy or taking time off
work for childbirth. A closer look at the committee reports and the state-
ments by the sponsors of the PDA will give a clearer understanding of the
intended breadth of this statute.
Senator Williams, from the Committee on Human Resources, submit-
ted a report detailing the committee's reason for adopting the bill for the
PDA. In his report, Williams reiterated Justice Steven's dissent in Gilbert
when he wrote, "[b]y definition, such a rule discriminates on account of sex;
for it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the
female from the male." '39 By quoting from this language, Williams showed
that discrimination based on pregnancy or childbirth was in itself discrimi-
natory because it was only applicable to women. Williams did not contem-
plate a situation such as infertility that affects men and women equally.
In the committee report, Williams frequently referred to a need to ad-
dress discrimination based on pregnancy and childbirth. Williams asserted
that a "failure to address discrimination based on pregnancy ... would pre-
vent the elimination of sex discrimination in employment."' 4 Williams con-
tinued, stating that the "bill does not require employers to treat pregnant
women in any particular manner ... [but] would simply require that preg-
nant woman be treated the same as other employees on the basis of their
ability or inability to work."'' The committee's intent was to protect preg-
nant women specifically. Congress was concerned that if the law stood as it
did after Gilbert, pregnant women would have no protection from discrimi-
nation. There is no evidence within the entire committee report that the
senators intended for this protection to cover infertility or infertility treat-
ment. The language continues in a similar vein when turning to the state-
ments made by the sponsors of the bill.
In his opening remarks before the debate on the senate floor, Senator
Williams reiterated the rationale in his committee report. He stated that this
statute would "prohibit discrimination on the basis of pregnancy or condi-
tions arising out of pregnancy for all employment-related purposes."' 42 Ac-
138. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
139. LEGIS. HISTORY OF PDA, supra note 6, at 39-40.
140. Id. at 40 (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 40-41 (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 62.
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cording to Williams's opening remarks, a major reason for the bill was to
deter the common practice of putting "pregnant women on mandatory unpa-
id leave, regardless of their ability or inability to work.' 43 Senator Bayh,
another sponsor, stated that discrimination against pregnant workers was the
major concern of the bill. He said "[d]iscrimination against pregnant work-
ers remains one of the areas of employment discrimination facing women in
the work force."' "
These statements indicate that the PDA sponsors' major concern was to
correct the lack of protection given specifically to pregnant women in the
workforce. The legislative history makes no reference to a lack of protection
for those who are infertile. It seems absurd to add infertility to the interpre-
tation of the statute when there is no evidence that Congress contemplated
such broad coverage at the time of the bill's passage. Congress may take
corrective measures if it believes infertility should be added within the un-
derstanding of the PDA, but it is not the courts' job to expand its coverage.
The courts in Pacourek and Erickson both relied upon the legislative
history of the PDA to prove that infertility is within its scope of coverage. 45
In Pacourek, the court relied on language such as "because of their capacity
to become pregnant" and "on the grounds that they might become pregnant"
to prove this point. 46 The rationale of these courts is that if certain language
in the legislative history demanded protection for women who possibly are
or possibly might become pregnant, then protection should be granted for
those women who use infertility treatment to become pregnant. Also, the
court in Erickson stated that language in the legislative history, similar to
that given in Pacourek, prohibits an employer from discriminating on the
basis of a woman's ability to become pregnant.
47
The court in Krauel argued against these premises by pointing out that
Pacourek relied heavily on the argument that the language in the legislative
history permitted a broad interpretation of the PDA. Yet there is no direct
evidence in any of the language cited in Krauel that "Congress intended
infertility to be covered by the PDA.' 141 With the plethora of language with-
in the legislative history of the PDA, it seems apparent that Congress would
have been more specific if it intended the PDA to cover more than pregnan-
cy and childbirth.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 77.
145. Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1402 (N.D.111. 1994); Erickson v.
Bd. of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 316, 319-20 (N.D.II1. 1995).
146. Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1402 (quoting 123 Cong. Reg. 29385 (1977)) (emphasis
in original).
147. Erickson, 911 F. Supp. at 320.
148. Krauel, 95 F.3d at 680.
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The legislative history of the PDA shows that the legislators intended
the PDA to protect against sex discrimination involving pregnancy and
childbirth. This well-established specificity clearly defined the legislator's
intended scope of protection. The legislative history makes no mention of
infertility or infertility treatment; therefore, it would be wrong to read such
terms into the scope of a statute that is clearly defined.
IV. CONCLUSION
In applying the proper case law and different tools of statutory interpre-
tation, it becomes clear that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not pro-
tect persons that are infertile or receive infertility treatments. This note does
not argue that infertility or infertility treatments should not be protected; it
only argues that neither infertility nor infertility treatments are protected
under Title VII as the PDA is currently written. Hopefully the Supreme
Court of the United States will rehear this issue in the near future and give
definite clarity to the scope of the PDA. Until that time, however, the infe-
rior courts will remain split on both sides of this intellectual divide.
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